That morning, the chef-de-cabinet had had a major confrontation with Minister of State Jean-Paul PROUST. “Number Two” (PROUST) had dug in his heels, refusing to restructure SIGER, as ordered by the Prince, and demanding that he be permitted to create his own intelligence service with Alain MALRIC at the helm. “And he questions,” JLA told me, “having an American or Anglo-Saxon former CIA guy doing intelligence for the Prince.”
A minister who questions the Sovereign Prince of Monaco? If such a thing had happened to Prince Rainier, the minister would quickly become an ex-minister, finito bon soir.
PROUST also refused the Prince’s request to provide JLA with an internal report he had just prepared on Franck BIANCHERI. Instead, he insisted on handing his whitewash to the Prince personally.
“Think very carefully about what you are saying and doing,” JLA told him. “The Prince is expecting you to give me this report this morning.”
PROUST did not budge an inch.
I could see in his mind’s eye what had transpired: When PROUST snuck in to see the Prince a few days earlier, after JLA had left for the weekend, he played Albert like a fiddle. In all likelihood, the Prince had undercut his chef de cabinet, saying he could bypass JLA and deliver the report directly to him.
This was not Machiavellian cunning on the Prince’s part, as he might have rationalized. Quite the contrary: it reflected Albert’s insecurity and weakness as a leader; he could not stand up to his minister of state, and PROUST knew it.
BIANCHERI had not resigned, as the Palace had requested and anticipated, and PROUST stood by the finance minister, whitewash in hand.
Simply put, Albert was not at the wheel of his ship.
Not only did PROUST willfully obstruct direct orders from the Palace, he continued to regularly badmouth JLA, Prince Albert, and Monaco to those among his French cronies who would listen. Said an officer from SIGER, shaking his head: “He [Proust] treats Monaco like a French colony, he thinks we’re in Cameroon.”
I learned from a spy within the minister of state’s camp that a) PROUST did not care what the Palace wanted to do b) could care less about anything JLA instructed him to do as the Prince’s representative, and c) subscribed to a French imperialistic view of Monaco: it’s a small state—who do they think they are?
The first to arrive at an M-Base bash celebrating the Prince’s birthday was an adviser to Prince Philippe of Liechtenstein who had facilitated the reformation of that principality’s banking system, and would introduce me to the chief of Liechtenstein’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the nearest thing the tiny microstate had to an intelligence service.
I introduced the adviser to the Prince and JLA when they arrived together just before six o’clock, and JLA agreed to receive the team two weeks hence for a presentation on Liechtenstein’s new bank model.
I took the opportunity to introduce several operatives and support staff to the Prince during the party.
Next morning, when several of the support staff strolled Rue Princesse Caroline for lunch at Pizza Pino at Place des Armes, my deputy detected surveillance: A young fellow, mid-thirties, shaven head; he made three passes, changing his jacket for the third pass.
The so-called Moscow Rules applied: Once, an accident, twice a coincidence, three times, enemy action.
On March 21st, I traveled to Paris for a meeting with the DST and conveyed to its director the on-going problem with Minister of State Proust, which, in effect, was insubordination.
Said the Director, with some astuteness, “Why doesn’t the Prince replace him? It was his father’s appointment.”
This clued me into an important truth: The French government would have no objection to the Prince choosing his own minister of state mid-term. Furthermore, by not doing so, the Prince, in their eyes, was failing the strength test.
Although well informed by our intelligence service, the Prince had floundered--and squandered the opportunity to make his mark.
The wolves, at first cowering and frightened by the Prince’s proclamation of a “new ethic,” now perceived him as a wounded deer and circled round, spoiling for the kill.
I desired to discern from the DST’s director if his institution supported PROUST in his effort to create an intelligence service with MALRIC. I came away from the DST’s 13th floor convinced that the DST had not informed PROUST about its unofficial relationship with me; the DST had no desire to work with PROUST and MALRIC; the DST was tres content working with me.
I also walked away with the impression that Mr. Director did not even like PROUST, which was understandable, since the Director was dignified with an aristocratic bearing and PROUST’s demeanor was, well, quite the opposite.
I telephoned JLA from Gare du Nord railway station to convey this message: The French would be both and pleased and impressed if the Prince replaced the pertinacious PROUST.